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dependency. – III. Diagnosing the problem. – IV. The challenge. – V. A five-point plan. – V.1. Reform must 
address the circumstances of all States, not just the powerful few. – V.2. Plan for, rather than simply react 
to, refugee movements. – V.3. Embrace common but differentiated State responsibility. – V.4. Shift away 
from national, and towards international, administration of refugee protection. – V.5. Access to protec-
tion, and to a solution. 
 
ABSTRACT: The author argues that the time is right to change the way that refugee law is imple-
mented. Specifically, Hathaway advocates a shift towards a managed and collectivized approach to 
the implementation of refugee protection obligations. He contends that while the obligations un-
der the Convention remain sound, the mechanisms for implementing those obligations are flawed 
in ways that too often lead States to act against their own values and interests, and which produce 
needless suffering amongst refugees. The author concludes with a five-point plan to revitalize the 
Refugee Convention. 
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I. The Refugee Convention’s commitment to self-sufficiency 
The United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention) 
is increasingly marginal to the way in which refugee protection happens around the 
world. I believe that this is a bad thing – both for refugees, and for States. 
 
¤ Starting with its very first issue, European Papers intends to keep the on-going, epochal refugee 
crisis “On the Agenda”. The two contributions published in this issue are meant to open a debate which 
will be followed up in the upcoming issues. 
* James E. and Sarah A. Degan Professor of Law, University of Michigan, and Distinguished Visiting 
Professor of International Refugee Law, University of Amsterdam, jch@umich.edu. 
This is a revised version of the essay J.C. HATHAWAY, A Global Solution to a Global Crisis, in Open De-
mocracy, 29 February 2016, www.opendemocracy.net, with full debate in the section Open Global Rights. 
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In introducing the draft of the Refugee Convention some 65 years ago, the UN’s first 
Secretary General explained that “[t]his phase [...] will be characterized by the fact that 
the refugees will lead an independent life in the countries which have given them shel-
ter. With the exception of the ‘hard core’ cases, the refugees will no longer be main-
tained by an international organization as they are at present. They will be integrated in 
the economic system of the countries of asylum and will themselves provide for their 
own needs and for those of their families”. 
II. The ground reality of dependency 
Yet today, and despite the fact that 148 countries have signed onto the Refugee Con-
vention, the reality is quite the opposite. Most refugees today are not allowed to live in-
dependent lives. Most refugees are maintained by an international organization. And 
most refugees are emphatically not allowed to provide for their own needs. 
In order to be able to contribute to meeting their own needs, the most obvious 
need of refugees is to enjoy freedom of movement. Yet one in four refugees in the 
world is effectively imprisoned, and at least as many are often subject to serious re-
strictions on their mobility. In an especially cruel irony, United Nations refugee agency, 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), runs more refugee 
camps than anyone else. Not only is this response unlawful, it is absurdly counter-
productive. Refugees become burdens on their hosts and the international community, 
and are debilitated in ways that often make it difficult for them ever to return home, in-
tegrate locally, or resettle. The risk of violence in refugee camps is also endemic – with 
women and children especially vulnerable to the anger that too often arises from being 
caged up. 
III. Diagnosing the problem 
What went wrong? 
One thing that is not wrong is the Refugee Convention itself. Its definition (“a well-
founded fear of being persecuted” for discriminatory reasons) has proved wonderfully 
flexible, identifying new groups of fundamentally disfranchised persons unable to bene-
fit from human rights protection in their own countries. 
At least as important, its catalogue of refugee-specific rights remains as valuable to-
day as ever. The underlying theory of the Refugee Convention is emphatically not the 
creation of dependency by hand-outs. It guarantees the social and economic rights that 
refugees need to be able to get back on their feet after being forced away from their own 
national community (e.g., to access education, to seek work, and to start businesses). 
It was patently obvious to the States that drafted the refugee treaty that refugees 
could not begin to look after themselves, much less to contribute to the well-being of 
their host communities, if they were caged up. For this reason, as soon as a refugee has 
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submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the host country, satisfied authorities of her 
identity, and addressed any security-related concerns, the Refugee Convention requires 
that she be afforded not only freedom of movement, but the right to choose her place 
of residence – a right that continues until and unless the substance of her refugee claim 
is negatively determined. Respecting this legal guarantee of refugee mobility can dra-
matically change the policy outcomes of admitting refugees; indeed, a recent study 
shows that those countries that do facilitate refugee freedom of movement are often 
economically advantaged by the presence of refugees.1 
Why, then, do States not routinely liberate the productive potential of refugees? 
Part of the reason is that setting up refugee camps is an easy one size fits all an-
swer that can be quickly and efficiently rolled out by both the UNHCR and many of its 
many humanitarian partners. When there is a political imperative to act, the establish-
ment of camps is a concrete and visible sign of engagement. Indeed, even as the re-
gional States receiving the overwhelming majority of Syrian refugees were largely ig-
nored by the rest of the world, international donors stepped forward to finance the 
building and operation of refugee camps.2 
Most fundamentally, though, the detention of refugees is a strategy that appeals to 
States that would prefer to avoid their international duty to protect refugees. While not 
willing to accept the political cost of formally renouncing the treaty, States with the eco-
nomic and practical wherewithal have for many years sought to ensure that refugees 
never arrive at their jurisdiction, at which point duties inhere. The strategy of deter-
rence has, however, come under increasingly successful challenge, including before the 
European Court of Human Rights.3 Poorer States, as well as those with especially po-
rous borders, have of course rarely been able to deter refugee arrivals at all. For States 
in either situation, restricting the mobility of refugees by detention or similar practices 
(often accompanied by other harsh treatment post-arrival) is seen as a second-best 
means for a State to send a signal that they are not open to the arrival of refugees. 
But why are States so often unwilling to receive refugees? 
Safety and security are of course frequently invoked. While such concerns can be 
real, there is, however, no empirical evidence that refugees present a greater threat of 
crime or violence than do the many other non-citizens routinely crossing borders, or 
indeed those already resident in the State, including citizens. In any event, the Refugee 
Convention takes a very hard line on such cases, requiring the exclusion from refugee 
status of any person reasonably suspected of being a criminal, and allowing States to 
 
1 A. BETTS, L. BLOOM, J. KAPLAN, N. OMATA, Refugee Economies Rethinking Popular Assumptions, in Hu-
manitarian Innovation Project, 20 June 2014, www.rsc.ox.ac.uk. 
2 R.F. SWEIS, Despite Good Intentions: Vacancies in Refugee Camp in Jordan for Syrians, in The New 
York Times, 15 March 2015, www.nytimes.com. 
3 T. GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN, J.C. HATHAWAY, Non-Refoulement in a World of Cooperative Deterrence, in 
Columbia Journal of Translational Law, 2015, p. 235 et seq. 
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send away those shown to pose a threat to their safety or security, even back to the 
country of persecution, if there is no other option. 
The real concern is instead that most governments believe that refugees who arrive 
at their borders impose unconditional and indefinite obligations on them, and on them 
alone. The idea that the arrival of refugees can effectively subvert a State’s sovereign 
authority over immigration is understandably unsettling to even powerful States. For 
States of the less developed world, which receive more than 80 per cent of the world’s 
refugees, the challenge can be acute. They are supported by no more than the (often 
grossly inadequate and inevitably fluctuating) charity of wealthier countries, and rarely 
benefit from meaningful support to lessen the human responsibility of protection. Of 
the roughly 14 million refugees in the world last year, only about 100,000 were reset-
tled, with just two countries, the United States and Canada, providing the lion’s share of 
this woefully inadequate contribution. 
IV. The challenge 
The challenge, then, is to ensure that refugees can access meaningful protection in a 
way that both addresses the legitimate concerns of States and which harnesses the ref-
ugees’ own ability to contribute to the viability of the protection regime. 
The irony is that the Refugee Convention itself suggests the way forward. The rights 
regime established by Arts 2-34 rejects a charity-based model in favour of refugee em-
powerment. The Refugee Convention is also massively attentive to the safety and secu-
rity concerns of States: not only are fugitives from justice mandatorily excluded from 
refugee status, but those shown to be risks to national security are subject to legally 
sanctioned refoulement. The Refugee Convention’s cessation clause moreover makes 
clear that States are not required permanently to admit refugees, but need only protect 
them for the duration of the risk in their home country. And perhaps most important, 
the refuge regime was never intended to operate in the atomized and uncoordinated 
way that has characterized most of its nearly 65-year history. To the contrary, the Pre-
amble to the Refugee Convention expressly recognizes that “the grant of asylum may 
place unduly heavy burdens on certain countries” such that real global protection “can-
not therefore be achieved without international co-operation”. 
This is not just another tired call for States to live up to what they have signed onto. 
It is rather a plea for us fundamentally to change the way that refugee law is imple-
mented. The obligations are right, but the mechanisms for implementing those obliga-
tions are flawed in ways that too often lead States to act against their own values and 
interests – and which produce needless suffering amongst refugees. 
V. A five-point plan 
How should we proceed? 
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A team of lawyers, social scientists, non-governmental activists, and governmental 
and intergovernmental officials, drawn from all parts of the world, worked for five years 
to conceive the model for a new approach to implementing the Refugee Convention. 
We reached consensus on a number of core principles.4 
v.1. Reform must address the circumstances of all States, not just the 
powerful few 
Most refugee reform efforts in recent years have been designed and controlled by 
powerful States: e.g., Australia and the EU. There has been no effort to share out fairly 
in a binding way the much greater burdens and responsibilities of the less developed 
world, even at the level of financial contributions or guaranteed resettlement opportu-
nities. This condemns poorer States and the 80 per cent of refugees who live in them to 
mercurial and normally inadequate support, leading often to failure to respect refugee 
rights. It is also decidedly short-sighted in that the absence of meaningful protection 
options nearer to home is a significant driver of efforts to find extra-regional asylum, 
often playing into the strategies of smugglers and traffickers. 
v.2. Plan for, rather than simply react to, refugee movements 
There is absolutely no need for the refugee system to be captive of a seemingly contin-
uous process of responding in an episodic way to multiple crises, with the inevitable 
loss of life that a reactive and uncoordinated response entails. The protection system 
should instead shift to a managed model, with the UNHCR able to act decisively by call-
ing on pre-determined burden (financial) sharing and responsibility (human) sharing 
quotas. Such factors as prior contributions to refugee protection, per capita GDP, and 
arable land provide sensible starting points for the allocation of shares of the financial 
and human dimensions of protection. But, as the recent abortive effort to come up with 
such shares ex post by the EU makes clear, the insurance-based logic of standing alloca-
tions can only be accomplished in advance of any particular refugee movement. 
v.3. Embrace common but differentiated State responsibility 
There should be no necessary connection between the place where a refugee arrives 
and the State in which protection for duration of risk will occur. Under present norms, 
and most emphatically under the country of first arrival norm enshrined in the Regula-
tion (EU) No 604/2013, the so-called Dublin Regulation, a refugee will nearly always be 
 
4 J.C. HATHAWAY (ed.), Reconceiving International Refugee Law, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 
1997; J.C. HATHAWAY, R.A. NEVE, Making International Refugee Law Relevant Again: A Proposal for Collecti-
vized and Solution-Oriented Protection, in Harvard Human Rights Journal, 1997, p. 115 et seq. 
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allowed to stay in her State of arrival.5 It thus makes sense for refugees to travel often 
far from home (and, in the EU context, to disguise any presence in a State other than 
the preferred destination) before claiming protection as a means of maximizing eco-
nomic or social outcomes. If in contrast the country of arrival were no more than the 
place in which a simplified status assessment (see below) and assignment of protective 
responsibility occurred, the perverse incentive to decide where to seek recognition of 
refugee status for reasons unrelated to protection needs would come to an abrupt end. 
In addition, a system of shared State responsibility for refugees would enable us to har-
ness the ability and willingness of different States to assist in different ways. The core of 
the renewed protection regime should be common but differentiated responsibility, 
meaning that beyond the common duty to provide first asylum pending an assignment 
of protective responsibility, States could assume a range of protection roles within their 
responsibility-sharing quota (protection for duration of risk; exceptional immediate 
permanent integration; residual resettlement), though all States would be required to 
make contributions to both (financial) burden-sharing and (human) responsibility-
sharing, with no trade-offs between the two. 
v.4. Shift away from national, and towards international, administra-
tion of refugee protection 
We advocate a revitalized UNHCR to administer quotas, with authority to allocate funds 
and refugees based on respect for legal norms; and encouragement of a shift to com-
mon international refugee status determination system and group prima facie assess-
ment to reduce processing costs, thereby freeing up funds for real and dependable 
support to front-line receiving countries, including start-up funds for economic devel-
opment that links refugees to their host communities, and which facilitate their eventu-
al return home. Our economists suggest that reallocation of the funds now spent on 
the many often very elaborate domestic asylum systems would more than suffice to 
fund this system. And since as described below positive refugee status recognition 
would have no domestic immigration consequence for the State in which status as-
sessment occurs, this savings could be realized without engaging sovereignty concerns. 
v.5. Access to protection, and to a solution 
The refugee system relies on migration as the means to protection: while managed en-
try is sometimes viable, international law prohibits barriers that impede refugees from 
voting with their feet in order to access the protection system wherever they are able, 
 
5 Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the crite-
ria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for in-
ternational protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless per-
son. 
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with no penalty for unlawful entry or presence. But it must be clearly understood that 
arrival does not entitle a refugee immediately to access permanent immigration. While 
some cases, e.g. unaccompanied minors and the severely traumatized, will require 
speedy permanent integration in some State, most refugees should instead benefit 
from protection for the duration of risk (with full access to refugee rights guaranteed) in 
order to promote the continual renewal of asylum capacity. Some refugees will ulti-
mately choose and be able to go home. For others, a new commitment to creative de-
velopment assistance linking refugees to host communities will increase the prospects 
for local integration. And for those still at risk and without access to either of these solu-
tions at five-seven years after arrival, residual resettlement will be guaranteed, enabling 
them to remake their lives, in stark contrast to the present norm of often indefinite un-
certainty. 
If we are serious about avoiding continuing humanitarian tragedy (not just in Eu-
rope, but throughout the world) then the present atomized and haphazard approach to 
refugee protection must end. The moment has come not to renegotiate the Refugee 
Convention, but rather at long last to operationalize that treaty in a way that works de-
pendably, and fairly. 
 
